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Abstract 
 
Post-traumatic stress disorder in children and adolescents has been studied only for 
the past 15 to 20 years and is the subject of a burgeoning corpus of research. Much 
research has focused on examining whether children and adolescents have the same 
responses to trauma as those experienced by adults. Many of the research tools used 
to investigate children’s responses are taken from measures designed for use with 
adults, and these measures have proven to be useful. However, it has not been 
established that children’s responses to traumatic events are related to the same 
underlying processes as adults’ responses. The possible application of two recent 
cognitive models of PTSD in adults to understanding PTSD in children and 
adolescents is discussed in this article, within the context of what is already known 
about children’s reaction to trauma and existing theoretical accounts of childhood 
PTSD. Particular attention is paid towards the nature of children’s memories of 
traumatic events and how these memories relate to the re-experiencing symptoms of 
PTSD, and cognitive processes that may play a role in the maintenance of PTSD. It is 
proposed that the adoption of a more specific cognitive-behavioral framework in the 
study of this disorder may be beneficial and lead to better treatment outcomes. 
 
Key words: Post-traumatic stress disorder, children, cognitive-behavioral model, 
traumatic memories, maintenance 
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Introduction 
 
It has been acknowledged only during the past 15 years or so that children and 
adolescents may suffer from PTSD. In one of the earliest considerations of children’s 
responses to trauma, Garmezy and Rutter (1985) concluded that children’s reactions 
to trauma were not as serious as those developed by adults, and that children’s 
reactions did not warrant inclusion within a diagnostic category of PTSD. This was 
due particularly to there being no reports that children exposed to disasters displayed 
PTSD-specific symptoms such as amnesia, psychic numbing or intrusive flashbacks.  
Particular barriers to the understanding of children’s reactions to traumatic events 
were quickly highlighted. Yule and Williams (1990) pointed out that studies of 
children exposed to trauma are difficult to conduct due to the tendency of adults to be 
highly protective towards such children and deny that children can suffer psychiatric 
disturbance following trauma. In addition, these authors noted that one of the earliest 
studies (Galante & Foa, 1986) had not used scales appropriate for detection of 
traumatic stress reactions in children.  
A more detailed understanding of PTSD in children and adolescents was derived 
from the use of assessment measures designed specifically for PTSD. The Impact of 
Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) was utilized in a study of 
children involved in the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry disaster (Yule & Williams, 
1990). Children assessed using this self-report measure were found to score in a 
similar fashion to adults. The PTSD Reaction Index (PTSD-RI), a structured 
interview based on the DSM-III diagnostic criteria for PTSD, was used by Pynoos et 
al. (1987) to assess children who had witnessed a fatal sniper attack on their school 
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playground. Children in the playground at the time of the shooting were very likely to 
develop PTSD, with 77% developing moderate to severe levels of PTSD.  
These key articles that helped to bring about an acceptance of the validity of 
the PTSD diagnosis in children utilized scales and interviews based on diagnostic 
criteria initially designed for adults. The study of reactions to traumatic events has 
been conducted formally for several more years within the adult population, and a 
number of theories concerning the etiology of PTSD have been suggested. Before 
theoretical insights can be gleaned from research on adult populations subjected to 
trauma however, the issue remains of whether it is appropriate to continue to assume 
that child PTSD is essentially the same disorder as that found in adults.  
It is the purpose of this review to examine the theoretical understanding of 
children’s and adolescents’ reactions to trauma and how such an understanding may 
benefit from models of PTSD in adults. First, a brief critical review of theoretical 
accounts of PTSD in children and adolescents will be provided. Secondly, two recent 
cognitive models of PTSD in adults that have been shown to account for many of the 
key features of PTSD and have generated testable hypotheses will be outlined. Third, 
evidence concerning the pattern of re-experiencing observed in children will be 
considered. Fourth, the applicability of cognitive processes proposed in adult models 
of PTSD to PTSD in children and adolescents will be discussed. Fifth and finally, an 
examination will be provided of how the framework proposed within this article may 
guide future research into children’s and adolescents’ reactions to trauma.  
 
 
Current understanding of PTSD in children and adolescents 
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In this section, a brief overview will be provided of the most significant 
conceptualizations of PTSD in children and adolescents that have been offered over 
the past 15 years. The models were selected so as to provide an idea of the breadth of 
theoretical perspectives adopted so far in trying to understand children’s responses to 
trauma, and the selection is by no means exhaustive. 
Pynoos and colleagues (Pynoos, Steinberg, & Wraith, 1995; Pynoos, 1994; 
Pynoos, Steinberg, & Goenjian, 1996; Pynoos, Steinberg, & Piacentini, 1999) have 
considered children and adolescents’ reactions to trauma within a developmental life-
trajectory model. A child’s short-term reaction to a trauma is considered to be 
moderated by four groups of factors: i) proximal trauma reminders (e.g., external and 
internal cues, physiological reactivity), ii) proximal secondary stresses (e.g., changes 
to family and community circumstances), iii) the “ecology” of the child (e.g., 
parental, school and peer factors), and iv) factors intrinsic to the child (e.g., genetic 
predisposition, developmental competencies). In particular, it is argued that “the 
etiology of posttraumatic distress, [is derived from] the nature of the traumatic 
experience(s) and from the subsequent traumatic reminders and secondary stressors 
[Pynoos, Steinberg, & Wraith, 1995, p. 72; the italics are the original author’s]”. A 
child’s long-term reaction and adjustment is likely to be related to ongoing reminders 
of the trauma and persistent secondary stressors (e.g., physical disability, judicial 
proceedings, etc.).  
This conceptualization is important as it integrates existing psychodynamic, 
familial, cognitive-behavioral and psychopharmacological approaches to children and 
adolescents’ reactions to trauma, and leaves little doubt as to the dramatic impact of 
“the legacy of trauma”. With regards to future research, Pynoos and colleagues 
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advocate the investigation of a number of areas, including the development of brain 
mechanisms and how PTSD intersects with other anxiety disorders over the life span.  
In a review of the literature concerning PTSD in children and adolescents, 
Fletcher (1996) adopted a multifactorial model similar to that of Pynoos and 
colleagues. Fletcher concluded that children react to trauma in a way very similar to 
that of adults, and called for further research to examine why it is that some children 
develop PTSD while others do not. He also stressed that factors other than those 
relating to exposure to trauma must be investigated. 
Schwarz and Perry (1994) emphasized the neurobiological impact of a 
traumatic event, noting that acute stress results in the increased activation of the 
noradrenergic system which plays an important role in a number of behaviors that are 
readily identified as being related to PTSD; arousal regulation, vigilance, irritability, 
locomotion, attention, sleep, and the startle response. The neurobiological changes 
thought to result from traumatic stress also “create an adaptive record of survival-
related information [Schwarz & Perry, 1994, p.312]”. Such records, termed 
“malignant memories” by Schwarz and colleagues (Schwarz & Kowalski, 1991; 
Schwarz, Kowalski, & Hanus, 1993), are hypothesized to possess a neural network 
architecture and incorporate information derived from the traumatic event that that 
has a potential bearing on the individual’s survival.  
The activation of these memories by trauma-related cues results in the 
individual experiencing high levels of noxious arousal, and potentially, cognitive 
distortions, memory changes, dissociative states, and altered behavioral and affective 
activity. It is further noted from animal studies that the developing brain is 
particularly sensitive to stress, especially when such stress is unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. The authors proposed therefore that children exposed to trauma may 
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develop brains with dysregulated neurophysiological systems and neuroanatomical 
structures that may leave them more vulnerable to suffering from exposure to 
psychosocial stressors when they reach maturity. The authors described how younger 
children exposed to trauma may experience a more pervasive and persistent increase 
in basal autonomic tone and develop a post-traumatic reaction where symptoms are 
elicited by more general stimuli that are unrelated to the trauma. 
An integrative conceptual model that incorporated exposure to trauma, child 
characteristics (such as gender and age), access to social support and coping styles 
was tested in a sample of elementary school-aged children exposed to a hurricane 
(Vernberg, La Greca, Silverman, & Prinstein, 1996). Vernberg et al. found that the 
four factors identified in the model were together able to predict a considerable 
amount of the variance in PTSD symptomatology. This study is of importance as it 
compares the relative importance of exposure variables to non-exposure variables 
such as social support and coping, and identifies specific targets for treatment (e.g., 
the use of blame and anger). Follow-up investigations of the same sample of children 
(La Greca, Silverman, Vernberg, & Prinatein, 1996) found that at seven and 10 
months after the disaster the model accounted for less variance in PTSD 
symptomatology. Although a considerable number of children thought they might die 
during the hurricane (60%), far fewer were hurt or actually witnessed other people 
being hurt during the event. The success of the model in predicting children’s 
reactions may result partly from investigating a sample exposed to a comparatively 
moderate trauma where the protective effects of social support and coping may be 
more pronounced. Nevertheless, this study presents a significant advance in the 
methodology and theory used in the investigation of children’s responses to trauma. 
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A number of reviews, while not proposing a specific model of PTSD in 
children and adolescents, have outlined etiological factors that have been shown to 
predict the occurrence of the disorder (Amaya-Jackson & March, 1995; Vogel & 
Vernberg, 1993; Pfefferbaum, 1997; American Association of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry, 1998; Foy, Madvig, Pynoos, & Camilleri, 1996; Gurwitch, Sullivan, & 
Long, 1998; Yule, Perrin, & Smith, 1999). The most widely accepted predictor of 
PTSD is exposure severity, while gender, prior exposure to trauma, prior psychiatric 
disorder, and family functioning also seem to be emerging as having predictive value. 
A less clear picture exists of the relationship between variables such as age and 
ethnicity and post-traumatic stress reactions. 
A recent review has examined how a cognitive theory of childhood PTSD 
needs to accommodate developmental factors (Salmon & Bryant, 2002). The authors 
of this review highlight the need to consider developmental issues that have a bearing 
on how a child may encode and then resolve a traumatic experience. The development 
of language is thought to be of particular importance, both when a trauma is 
experienced and when a child attempts to deal with the traumatic event. The social 
world of the child is examined, and the role of the family in assisting a child to form 
complete memories of a trauma is stressed. The authors conclude by providing a 
relatively clear description of how developmental issues might be considered in both 
the assessment and treatment of children suffering from PTSD. The role of the family 
in both assessment and treatment is stressed, in particular the potential negative effect 
that parents may have in reinforcing a child’s avoidant coping. Methods for 
supporting young children to communicate their experiences and the empirical 
support for providing such assistance are described. 
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The reviews described above have demonstrated how the understanding of 
children and adolescents’ reactions to traumatic experiences has advanced to 
incorporate theory from a variety of domains. Many studies have been directed at 
examining core assumptions regarding the nature of PTSD in children, such as the 
pattern of symptomatology observed in children following trauma. The need for 
further research into a number of aspects of children’s reactions is widely 
acknowledged. Yet, it remains the case that such research is rarely driven by a 
coherent model that explains the processes that are involved in the formation of 
specific PTSD symptoms such as intrusive memories, flashbacks, and hyperarousal. 
The adoption of such a theoretical account may offer clearer guidelines as to how 
research may be directed beyond examining demographic and psychosocial variables.  
Clearly, a theoretical account of PTSD in children and adolescents will need to 
be able to encompass the full range of aberrations of behaviour, cognition, 
physiology, and consciousness that are associated with PTSD within a developmental 
context. Existing models have demonstrated a degree of success in accounting for 
these aberrations, yet inadequacies are also present. For example, Schwarz and Perry 
(1994) considered the role of developmental neurobiology with regards to specific 
PTSD symptoms. Similarly, Salmon and Bryant (2002) placed their discussion of 
childhood PTSD in the context of “fear networks” (Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 
1989). However, the kinds of single-level representations of emotion proposed within 
these accounts are limited in their explanatory power (Power & Dalgleish, 1997), 
especially with regards to some of the more disturbing symptoms of PTSD, such as 
flashbacks and emotional numbing; such accounts cannot explain the discontinuity 
between the re-experiencing of traumatic events, where adults and children may 
experience overwhelming sensations as experienced at the time of the trauma, and the 
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normal, voluntary activation of autobiographical memories. In the next section two 
cognitive models of PTSD in adults that assume multi-level representations of 
traumatic events are outlined which may also inform the development of a model of 
PTSD in younger people. 
 
 
Cognitive Models of PTSD in Adults 
 
Two models of PTSD in adults have had a tremendous impact on the 
understanding of the disorder in recent years. This more recent generation of models 
of PTSD, in addition to overcoming the problems associated with single-level theories 
of emotion as outlined above, provide more powerful explanations of the time course 
of reactions to traumatic events and individual differences in the nature of such 
reactions.  
In the first model to be considered here, that of Brewin et al. (1996), it is 
suggested that the complex pattern of symptomatology observed in individuals with 
PTSD could be explained by a dual representation model, where the memories of the 
traumatic event are stored in a different manner to normal memories. These memories 
remain in a sensory format and are hypothesized to be represented within different 
neural structures than normal memories.  
Brewin (2001) has presented evidence from a cognitive neuroscience perspective 
that suggests “traumatic memories” are laid down in a way that bypasses the 
hippocampus, the neural structure considered to be responsible for the encoding of 
memories within a temporal and spatial context. As a result of this difference in 
information processing, “the sensory (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.), physiological, 
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and motor aspects of the traumatic experience are represented in situationally 
accessible knowledge in the form of analogical codes that enable the original 
experience to be recreated” [Brewin et al., 1996, p.676-677]. Such representations, 
termed “situationally accessible memories” (SAMs) by Brewin et al. (1996), are re-
experienced as the result of elicitation through associative learning; trauma-related 
cues will be likely to trigger such re-experiencing. This qualitative difference in 
representation also means that traumatic memories are not easily accessible by 
conscious means.  
Such an account gives a powerful explanation of the cardinal cluster of symptoms 
observed in individuals with PTSD: the re-experiencing phenomena. The difference in 
representation may account for how flashbacks are experienced frequently as 
dissociative states. The conscious activation of SAMs is thought to allow changes in 
such representations of a traumatic event, whereby conditioned emotional responses 
are extinguished through a process of “spontaneous or programmed habituation” [p. 
678]. Such habituation, and the associated normalization of attentional and memory 
biases, is responsible for decreasing the likelihood of intrusively re-experiencing the 
traumatic event. 
However, the full resolution of a traumatic event also may be contingent on an 
individual’s verbally accessible memory (VAM) of the event. VAMs are theorized to 
consist of representations of a person’s conscious experience of a traumatic event, 
such as sensory features, emotional and physiological reactions, and the perceived 
meaning of the event. Significantly such a representation is likely to be subject to 
deliberate retrieval from an individual’s store of autobiographical memories. Brewin 
et al. (1996) stressed that “secondary emotional reactions arising from subsequent 
conscious appraisal” [p. 682] may interfere with the emotional processing of a 
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traumatic experience. Attributions of responsibility made after a traumatic event, 
leading to emotions such as guilt or anger, in addition to being themselves distressing, 
may prevent the habituation of fear when SAMs are activated. Therefore, the authors 
therefore suggest that prior to the use of exposure treatment, such secondary emotions 
be addressed using cognitive techniques.  
Brewin et al. (1996) go on to describe three endpoints of emotional processing 
that arise from the dual representation theory proposed. Completion or integration 
results when memories of the traumatic event have been fully “worked through”, and 
are integrated with the individual’s other memories and sense of self in the world. In 
particular, the individual will have habituated to their SAMs of the event. The 
presence of unremitting PTSD is termed “chronic emotional processing”, and is 
thought to be associated with inability to integrate memories of the trauma. This may 
be the result of aversive secondary emotions, as described above, the lack of social 
support to assist processing of SAMs or VAMs, and ongoing trauma, among other 
causes. In addition to the symptoms of PTSD, an individual caught in this stage will 
continue to have attentional and memory biases towards trauma-related information, 
and develop more generalized secondary reactions. The final endpoint of processing, 
“premature inhibition of processing”, results when the individual succeeds in avoiding 
the activation of unpleasant SAMs and VAMs. While the triggering of negative affect 
may be automatically avoided by the development of “avoidance schemas”, the 
individual will continue to have attentional biases, impaired memory for the trauma, 
avoidance for trauma-related stimuli, and possibly somatization. 
The second of this new generation of models of PTSD in adults is that of Ehlers 
and Clark (2000). Ehlers and Clark (2000) based their model on a dual representation 
format very similar to that of Brewin et al. (1996), but elaborate on both the 
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pathological role of “trauma memory” (their term for Brewin et al.’s “SAMs”), and 
the cognitions, meta-cognitions and thought control strategies considered responsible 
for the maintenance of PTSD. Ehlers and Clark argued that the combination of trauma 
memory and the negative appraisal of trauma and its sequelae result in a perception of 
“current threat” that is accompanied by intrusive phenomena, hyperarousal, anxiety 
and other emotional responses.  
Ehlers and colleagues have demonstrated the maintaining effect of a sense of 
“current threat” in victims of physical and sexual assault (Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 
1999), political prisoners (Ehlers, Maercker, & Boos, 2000), and motor vehicle 
accident (MVA) survivors (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Steil & Ehlers 2000). In 
addition to the presence of poorly elaborated trauma memories (the recall of which is 
easily triggered by associated cues), a number of cognitions and meta-cognitions are 
thought to give rise to this mental state. These include: Dysfunctional meaning 
attached to symptoms of the trauma (e.g., believing that having flashbacks is a sign 
that one is “going mad”); Perceived negative responses from others (e.g., “people 
think I am too weak to cope on my own”); A sense of permanent change (e.g., “my 
life is ruined”); And change in global beliefs (e.g., “the world is a dangerous place”).  
The power of meta-cognition to impede recovery from the acute phase of the 
disorder was demonstrated by Steil and Ehlers (2000) in their finding that the distress 
caused by re-experiencing symptoms of MVAs was related to the idiosyncratic 
meaning assigned to the symptoms (e.g., believing that intrusive thoughts are a sign 
that one is going “mad”). This relationship existed regardless of intrusion frequency, 
accident severity, and general anxiety-related catastrophic cognitions. In addition, 
dysfunctional meaning attached to traumatic symptoms was found to be associated 
with maladaptive coping strategies such as avoidance, thought suppression (an active 
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effort to rid one’s mind of a cognition), rumination and distraction. These strategies 
are considered to discourage the full processing of traumatic memories, and in the 
case of thought suppression, paradoxically encourage the production of distressing 
intrusive cognitions. A considerable body of work has shown that thought suppression 
(see Purdon, 1999, for a review) is responsible for an increase in the frequency of 
intrusive thoughts and memories.  
Thus, cognitions and meta-cognitions that are formed after a traumatic event may 
promote the maintenance of PTSD in two ways. Firstly, dysfunctional cognitions and 
meta-cognitions produce a sense that the trauma continues to have damaging 
implications, and consequently generate a feeling of apprehension. Secondly, the 
thought control strategies that result from these appraisals can discourage emotional 
processing of memories of the traumatic event. These cognitions and coping strategies 
may explain how a substantial proportion of traumatized adults emotionally engage in 
exposure treatments and yet do not proceed to habituation of the memories (Jaycox, 
Foa, & Morral, 1998). Therefore, Steil and Ehlers (2000) suggest that “therapeutic 
strategies aimed at identifying, restructuring, and changing the negative idiosyncratic 
meaning of posttraumatic intrusions should be helpful in alleviating posttraumatic 
symptomatology” [p. 555]. 
Ehlers and Clark (2000), like Brewin et al. (1996), consider exposure to be an 
integral part of cognitive behavioral interventions for PTSD, but argue that the 
adoption of cognitive restructuring during reliving may be useful. In this way 
problematic appraisals associated with key moments of the trauma may be identified 
and discussed, and the full benefits of exposure can be attained. While Ehlers and 
Clark expound more the potential role of cognitive techniques in the treatment of 
PTSD in adults, there exists, however, few significant conceptual differences between 
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their model and that of Brewin et al. (1996). Each accounts for the extreme nature of 
the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD, and the variation in outcome between 
survivors of trauma. In particular, the onset and maintenance of PTSD 
symptomatology are distinguished. The early onset of intrusive phenomena is 
considered a normal reaction to an extreme event (especially after more severe 
trauma). The maintenance of such symptoms is considered to result from a variety of 
maladaptive responses. 
 
 
The nature of children and adolescents’ memories of trauma 
 
While children and adolescents have been found to possess the same two-
factor structure of re-experiencing and avoidance observed in adults (Dyregrov, 
Kuterovac, and Barath, 1996), particular consideration must be given to children’s 
memories of traumatic events. Theorists positing a cognitive approach to PTSD in 
adults (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) regard the re-experiencing 
phenomena of the disorder not only to be its primary distinguishing feature, but also 
to be indicative of the central underlying abnormality that is responsible for the 
disorder: the nature of the memories of a traumatic event. These and other authors 
(e.g., van der Kolk, 1996) argue that traumatic events may be poorly encoded in 
memory, resulting in primitive representations of events. In addition such 
representations may also play a considerable role in maintenance of the hyperarousal 
cluster of symptoms, as the physiological changes encoded during the traumatic event 
are re-experienced. 
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It is essential therefore to consider whether the re-experiencing symptoms 
children experience are like those of adults; that is, such symptoms are the result of 
triggering involuntary recall of poorly elaborated, sensory based memories of the 
traumatic event. With regards to this, there is a growing body of research regarding 
the elicitation, form, and treatment of traumatic memories in children. Three avenues 
of research have addressed the issue of the existence and role of traumatic memories 
in children and adolescence: clinical reports of children’s memories of traumatic 
events, symptomatology profiles of samples of children exposed to trauma, and 
studies that have examined specifically the nature of children’s memories of traumatic 
events. 
Clinical reports of children’s memories of traumatic events 
The landmark case studies conducted into children’s reactions to traumatic 
events examined 5-14 year-old children involved in the Chowchilla bus kidnapping 
(Terr, 1981). Terr reported the presence of some symptoms that would be considered 
to fit DSM-IV criteria for re-experiencing: Nightmares or bad dreams with some 
content pertaining to the kidnapping, “posttraumatic play”, and behavioral re-
enactment. Flashbacks, however, were not observed in the children. Terr described 
how older children reported daytime visions of the kidnapping, but suggested that 
these re-experiencing episodes were voluntary. 
In a four-year follow-up study of these children, Terr (1983) reported that their 
memories of the kidnapping were largely unchanged, and that such memories were 
still recalled with a “vivid immediacy”. A significant number continued to engage in 
posttraumatic play and behavioral re-enactment, a variant of posttraumatic play which 
was considered to be less “fun”, and very often involved the re-experiencing of 
psychophysiological responses experienced during the kidnapping. Behavioral re-
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enactment is a feature of children’s reactions to trauma that may be readily 
conceptualized within the dual representation theory of Brewin et al. (1996) as the 
elicitation of motor responses recorded during the trauma.  
Perrin, Smith and Yule (2000) share the view that children and adolescents 
can suffer from intrusive thoughts about a traumatic event, adding that such 
phenomena can occur either when falling asleep or when triggered by external or 
internal reminders. Perrin et al. (2000) also briefly overview the debate regarding the 
reactions of very young children to trauma, noting that while evidence exists to 
suggest that this group does not suffer from visual flashbacks, they can display signs 
of re-experiencing through vivid re-enactment of the trauma (Scheeringa & Zeanah, 
1995; Scheeringa, Zeanah, Drell, & Larrieu, 1995). In short, many clinical reports 
note that children ‘re-see’ or ‘re-feel’ the trauma (Terr, 1991) and acknowledge the 
different sensory modalities that such experiences may take.  
Symptomatology profiles of samples of children exposed to trauma  
Beyond clinical reports, a number of studies have shown that the full range of 
re-experiencing symptomatology is found in children and adolescents who have been 
exposed to traumatic events. A meta-analysis conducted by Fletcher (1994, 
unpublished manuscript) examined thirty-four studies of children exposed to trauma 
(with a total sample size of 2, 697) and found similar rates of PTSD in child and adult 
samples. Fletcher (1996), in discussing these findings, concluded that the DSM-IV 
diagnosis of PTSD could be applied to all child age groups.  While the pattern of 
symptomatology in Fletcher’s meta-analysis for preschool children appears to be 
different to that of school- and teen-aged children (with pre-school children found to 
be more frequently distressed by reminders of the trauma, have bad dreams regarding 
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the trauma, and engaging in post-traumatic play), this meta-analysis does underscore 
the general acceptance that children re-experience traumatic events. 
Quantitative studies of children’s memories of traumatic events  
The finding that children and adolescents experience unwanted thoughts of 
traumatic events, have “flashbacks” (albeit not young children), and experience 
physiological arousal on exposure to trauma-related cues, supports the suggestion that 
children and adolescents can form SAMs of traumatic events. Further evidence 
suggesting that some children’s memories of traumatic events are comparable to the 
concept of SAMs comes from the few studies that have sought to assess the nature of 
these memories in children quantitatively. 
Burgess, Hartman, and Baker (1995) adopted a conceptual framework that 
incorporated neurobiological, information processing and psychodynamic approaches 
in their study of the memories of 34 physically and sexually abused children. The 
somatic, behavioral, verbal, and visual qualities of the children’s memories were 
examined. Somatic and behavioral memories of trauma were very common and 
clearly related to the sexual nature of much of the abuse that was endured by the 
children in this sample. Most children’s memories had a visual quality, though this 
finding was based on noting whether children were able to draw elements of the 
trauma they were exposed to. Such an indicator is likely to be highly insensitive due 
to children’s lack of artistic ability or unwillingness to draw their experiences. Verbal 
memories were of a varying quality, though only three children expressed no memory 
at all of what happened to them.  
Further data concerning the quality of children’s memories of trauma have 
been obtained from one study of pre-school aged children exposed to an extreme 
natural disaster. Azarian, Lipsitt, Miller, and Skriptchenko-Gregorian (1999) assessed 
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90 children, aged 10-44 months, after the 1988 Armenian earthquake. More than half 
of the sample had verbal memories of the earthquake, and nearly all displayed what 
the authors termed “non-verbal” memories: repetitive earthquake-related play, 
nightmares, and physiological and somatic reactions that were produced in reaction to 
specific reminders of the earthquake. An important finding of this study was that 
memory quality varied across the age range. The youngest age group, that of children 
aged 10-24 months, contained significantly fewer children with verbal memories than 
the two older groups, while the rates of non-verbal memory presentation remained 
approximately equal across the age span. 
The two studies discussed above lend weight to the possibility that children 
exposed to trauma can have non-verbal memories similar to the SAMs described by 
Brewin et al. (1996). It is noteworthy that Azarian et al. (1999) found that very young 
children had no verbal memories of the earthquake that they were exposed to, yet 
possessed non-verbal memories at the same rate as older children. That such young 
children lack verbal memories is entirely in keeping with their linguistic development 
(see Salmon & Bryant, 2002, for further discussion of this). However, if the ability to 
form verbal memories is protective one would have expected this group to 
demonstrate more non-verbal memories than older children, who with their more 
developed linguistic and cognitive abilities may have been more able to process the 
traumatic event. Brewin and colleagues note that adults with PTSD following a 
trauma may have some verbal account of the event, but that such accounts are likely 
to be fragmentary and more biased to describing sensory rather than semantic aspects 
of what occurred. 
In conclusion, it is suggested from the existing evidence that Brewin et al.’s 
(1996) concept of SAMs may be of explanatory relevance to children’s reactions to 
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trauma. Like adults’ re-experiencing of traumatic events, children are likely to possess 
emotion-laden memories composed of sensory fragments, that are easily elicited by 
reminders of the event, and can be experienced in the present as intrusive memories 
and “flashbacks”. Further studies of the memories of a greater age range of children 
are necessary to investigate this proposal. These should include prospective studies 
that examine the relationship between memory quality and PTSD symptomatology.  
The finding of Azarian et al. (1999) that the presence of verbal memories in 
young children may be protective against the development of non-verbal memories is 
in particular need of replication. If this is the case, then other barriers to the formation 
of coherent and non-intrusive memories other than linguistic ability will need to be 
investigated, such as emotional regulation and willingness to confront fear-eliciting 
internal or external stimuli. Indeed, one of the advances of the recent adult cognitive 
models of PTSD is the realization that while verbalizing a traumatic event is a 
necessary step in the processing of the event, other aspects of the traumatic memory 
also may need to be modified. Commentators on PTSD in children have drawn 
attention to young children’s limited ability to encode an event in a verbal form 
(Fivush, 1998; Salmon & Bryant, 2002). Future studies may be beneficially directed 
towards other aspects of children’s memories of trauma. Similarly, dissociation, 
which is considered to play a significant role in the onset of PTSD in adults by 
interfering with the process of forming a coherent memory of a traumatic event, has 
received little attention in studies of children and adolescents exposed to trauma. 
 
 
Cognitive and meta-cognitive processes involved in the maintenance of PTSD in 
children and adolescents 
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 Among the most significant advances brought about in the adult cognitive 
models of PTSD outlined above is their account of the time course of the disorder. 
Accounting for the time course of PTSD is considered a necessary component for any 
model (Dalgleish, 1999). Such necessity seems to stem from the finding that, at least 
for severe trauma such as rape, post-traumatic symptomatology in the immediate 
aftermath of such an event may be common (Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdoch, & 
Walsh, 1992).  
Dunmore, Ehlers, and Clark (1999, 2001) argued that factors responsible for 
the onset and maintenance of PTSD in adults are rarely distinguished in the literature, 
and that cognitive factors may play as significant a role in these aspects of the time 
course of PTSD as pre-traumatic and peri-traumatic experiences. Both Brewin et al. 
(1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) acknowledge that the onset of post-traumatic 
symptomatology may be strongly related to the quality of the memory laid down 
during the traumatic event, and argue that those individuals who suffer from more 
chronic PTSD are prevented in some way from processing such memories. This 
suggestion accounts for the finding that for many individuals the symptoms of PTSD 
are fleeting, whereas for others the disorder can last for many years. 
In the rest of this section an examination, is offered of the kinds of cognitive 
processes that may be involved in the maintenance of PTSD in children and 
adolescents. Appraisal, meta-cognitive, and information-processing aspects of 
cognition will be considered. First however, a caveat must be highlighted regarding 
the adoption of an onset-maintenance approach to PTSD in children and adolescents. 
While a growing body of research suggests that, as in adults, stress reactions in the 
immediate aftermath of a traumatic event may be quite common but diminish rapidly 
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for most individuals (American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 1998; 
Mirza, Bhadrinath, Goodyer, & Gilmour, 1998; Yule, Bolton, Udwin, Boyle, O’Ryan, 
& Nurrish, 2000), such findings should still be considered as tentative, especially in 
the case of young children who have been the subject of relatively few prospective 
studies. 
Secondary Emotions  
In the aftermath of a traumatic event, adults may develop what Brewin et al. 
(1996) term secondary emotions. According to these theorists, strong secondary 
emotions such as guilt and anger may interfere with the processing of traumatic 
memories by preventing a reduction in affect when traumatic memories are activated. 
Both anger and guilt (Goenjian, 1993; Gurwitch et al., 1998; Pynoos & Nader, 1988; 
Schwarz & Kowalski, 1991) are common reactions to trauma observed in children. To 
date both guilt (Pynoos et al., 1987) and anger (Vernberg, La Greca, Silverman, & 
Prinstein, 1996) have been shown to be associated with PTSD. 
Thought control strategies  
As discussed in detail above, the cardinal symptoms of PTSD are distressing 
intrusive thoughts, feelings, and images, through which the individual ‘re-
experiences’ the traumatic event. The way in which an individual responds to these 
reexperiencing phenomena can have significant repercussions; an important feature of 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model of PTSD is that maladaptive thought control 
strategies, such as rumination and thought suppression, paradoxically increase the 
frequency of the intrusions. Unlike other forms of avoidance that would appear to 
hinder the processing of traumatic memories, such as distraction, thought suppression 
would appear to actually exacerbate the reexperiencing symptoms.  
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Only two articles have evaluated the role of thought suppression in children 
with PTSD. In a study of 40 children exposed to MVAs, aged between eight and 
seventeen years old (mean age 13.6), Aaron, Zaglul, and Emery (1999) found that 
nearly one quarter of the exposed children developed PTSD (according to DSM-IV 
criteria). In a regression analysis of the assessed variables, only fear at the time of the 
traumatic event and thought suppression were found to be significant predictors of 
PTSD one month post-trauma, where greater fear and the greater endorsement of 
thought suppression were associated with worse symptoms.  
Certain flaws are apparent in this study, most notably the use of a scale that 
includes intrusion items in addition to thought suppression items (the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), a small sample size, and that the 
children were assessed only at one month post-trauma. Nevertheless the study used 
both the key post-traumatic stress self-report measures available for use with children 
(the IES and the PTSD-RI), and included a suitable control group (non-MVA 
attendees at an accident and emergency department). Ehlers, Mayou, and Bryant (in 
press) also offer support for the role of thought suppression in their study of children 
involved in MVAs, where a single item assessing this strategy was found to be a 
significant predictor of PTSD at both three and six months post-trauma. 
Dissuading a child from the use of thought suppression is a simple target for 
treatment. However further research is necessary to discover if thought suppression 
leads to an increase in the frequency of intrusive cognitions, as has been demonstrated 
in adults. Gaskell, Wells, and Calam (2001) demonstrated that the standard 
experimental thought suppression paradigm is workable with children aged seven to 
11 years, while also finding that this thought control strategy was not responsible for 
an increase in intrusive thoughts. 
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Other thought control strategies, such as distraction, which may not exacerbate 
the occurrence of intrusive thoughts and memories but may still delay the processing 
of traumatic memories, are worthy of investigation. Stallard, Velleman, Langsford, 
and Baldwin (2001) found that in their sample of 97 children aged seven to 18 years 
who had been involved in MVAs, the use of distraction was associated with a 
diagnosis of PTSD at six weeks after the accident, though was not predictive of PTSD 
at eight months post-trauma. Very little is known about the developmental course of 
thought control strategies with regards to PTSD or any other anxiety or depressive 
disorder. Unfortunately, the avoidance cluster of symptoms within the DSM-IV 
classification of PTSD includes one symptom for the avoidance of thoughts, feelings 
and conversations associated with a traumatic event; this crude grouping may mask 
important differences between adults and children in the use of what are quite 
distinguishable avoidant strategies. The findings of Aaron et al. (1999) and Ehlers et 
al. (in press) suggest that more detailed research regarding the varieties of cognitive 
avoidance is warranted.  
The negative interpretation of intrusive symptoms  
One factor only recently identified within the domain of adult PTSD is the 
interpretation of post-traumatic symptoms, in particular the intrusive symptoms (see 
Steil & Ehlers, 2000). For example, the occurrence of flashbacks may be seen by the 
individual as a sign that he or she is suffering from brain damage or “going mad”. 
Emotional numbness may be interpreted as indicating future unhappiness, as a result 
of being unable to form a close relationship with anyone (for further examples, see 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
In addition to further enhancing a sense of current threat, such cognitions also 
promote use of maladaptive thought control strategies, such as thought suppression 
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(see earlier). At present few studies in children have formally acknowledged the 
potential role of such interpretations. Terr (1983) noted that one of the Chowchilla bus 
kidnapping children had developed a fear of being afraid, a process that is related to 
the interpretation of symptoms. The only specific test of the role of these kinds of 
appraisals is that of Ehlers et al. (in press) where the appraisal of the self as going mad 
was associated with PTSD symptomatology at both three and six months post-trauma. 
A concept that has been more readily applied to child psychopathology is that 
of anxiety sensitivity. Anxiety sensitivity is the construct of tending to catastrophise 
or over-interpret signals of anxiety. Within adults, this construct has been identified as 
being closely associated with certain anxiety disorders (Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 
1992). Within children, the Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index (CASI; Silverman, 
Fleisig, Rabian, & Peterson 1991) has been used to account for a significant 
proportion of variance on measures of children’s fears and trait anxiety, which could 
not be explained by anxiety frequency. Increasingly evidence has suggested that this 
construct is a unique predictor of trait anxiety, and has potential implications for the 
assessment and treatment of anxiety (Silverman & Weems, 1999).  
With regards to the psychopathology of PTSD in children, no study has 
examined specifically the role of anxiety sensitivity, though two studies have 
examined the role of anxiety sensitivity in a group of children with a number of 
anxiety disorders (Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996; Weems, Hammond-Laurence, 
Silverman, & Ginsburg, 1998). While there is some disagreement over the age at 
which anxiety sensitivity might influence general anxiety and fearfulness (where 
Silverman & Weems, 1999, argue persuasively in support of their finding that 
younger children are affected by their anxiety sensitivity), the emerging consensus is 
that by 11 to 12 years children possess the cognitive capacity to be concerned with 
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abstract objects of fear, such as going crazy, losing control, or death. In each of these 
studies however, the number of children with PTSD was very small. This preliminary 
evidence that the construct of anxiety sensitivity is important in the development of 
anxiety disorders in children suggests that there is a pressing need to investigate meta-
cognitive processes in pediatric PTSD.  
Rumination  
Ehlers and Clark (2000) describe how individuals involved in a traumatic 
event may ruminate over issues such as how the event could have been prevented, and 
how justice or revenge might be achieved. They also propose four ways in which 
rumination may maintain PTSD: through strengthening maladaptive appraisals of the 
trauma, interfering with the processing of traumatic memories, increasing feelings of 
anxiety and hopelessness, and providing more internal cues to intrusive traumatic 
memories.  
Within child and adolescent populations, very few studies have examined 
children and adolescents’ use of rumination. Broderick (1998) assessed children aged 
between nine and 12 years for their responses to academic, family and peer problem 
situations, and found that girls used rumination as a means of coping with stressors 
more than boys. Studies examining the role of rumination in child psychopathology 
are even more scarce, in particular with regard to child’s reactions to trauma. Some 
studies have demonstrated that the attributions children and adolescents form 
concerning the causes of a traumatic event can influence the development of post-
traumatic symptomatology (Joseph, Brewin, Yule, & Williams, 1993), though very 
little research has examined the repetitive kind of preoccupation identified by Ehlers 
and Clark (2000). One study has examined rumination and PTSD in children, that of 
Ehlers et al. (in press), who found that two items pertaining to ruminative styles 
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(thinking about the trauma over and over, and wondering why the trauma happened to 
them) predicted the maintenance of PTSD symptoms.  
Broderick’s (1998) study makes apparent individual differences in the use of 
rumination among prepubescent children, and given the importance attached to 
rumination by recent studies of PTSD in adults (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Dunmore 
et al., 1999; Ehlers et al., 1998), further research in children exposed to traumatic 
events is warranted. In particular such research may need to examine whether specific 
cognitions such as those identified by Ehlers et al. (in press) result from an 
individual’s more global “behavioral-attentional style” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
“Current threat”, worry and attentional biases 
Following a traumatic event children suffering from PTSD are likely to have 
elevated levels of anxiety (Ellis, Stores, & Mayou, 1998; Lonigan, Shannon, Taylor, 
Finch, & Sallee, 1994; Vogel & Vernberg, 1993). Such anxiety is likely to be the 
result of a number of factors, but whatever the causes, ongoing anxiety is considered 
by most theorists to impair the successful processing of traumatic memories; 
accessing emotion-laden memories of a traumatic event is unlikely to produce clinical 
improvement if no extinction of fear can occur (Foa, Steketee, & Kozak, 1989).  
Ehlers and Clark (2000) describe how adults with PTSD often possess a 
particular form of anxiety that they term “current threat” (see above). These authors 
consider this state to be strongly related to various beliefs that an individual holds 
regarding their present condition and their more global worldview. A discussion of 
the possible role of children and adolescents’ views of their own symptomatology has 
been given above. With regards to their more global assumptions, a recent study by 
Bishop (2001) found that a traumatic event has little bearing on a child’s “assumptive 
world” (Janoff-Bulman, 1989); indeed the absence of a relationship between the 
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child’s beliefs about the world and their levels of anxiety and depression is taken to 
suggest the fascinating possibility that “children may deal with traumatic events by 
subsequently rejecting assumptions about the world that threaten their sense of 
security” [p. 404]. 
An early study into children’s fears following a traumatic event (a lightning 
strike at a boy’s football match) demonstrated that, not unsurprisingly, the children 
exposed to the tragedy were more likely than control groups to have fears and worries 
regarding a number of phenomena. These phenomena included lightning and 
thunderstorms, disasters, death and dying, as well as other events and situations that 
were not so related to the event they were exposed to, such as animals and the 
supernatural (Dollinger, O’Donnell, & Staley, 1984). While such fears may result 
from amendments to a child’s self-schema and external threat schemata (Kendall & 
Ingram, 1987; Kendall & Ronan, 1990), the intensity of such fears also may be 
aggravated by worrying.  
Vasey (1993), following the work of Borkovec, Shadick, and Hopkins (1991), 
defined worry as “an anticipatory cognitive process involving repetitive thoughts and 
images that contain fear-producing content related to possible traumatic events and 
their potentially catastrophic implications [p.7]”. Such a process is likely to play a 
significant role in enhancing specific fears following a traumatic event, in addition to 
maintaining a generally anxious mood. Vasey’s consideration of childhood worry 
centers largely around the role of children’s cognitive development, acknowledging 
that worry requires the ability both to anticipate future events as well as the related 
ability “to go beyond what is observable and consider what is merely possible [Vasey, 
1993, p.9]”. Before a child is seven to eight years of age, he or she is unlikely to be 
able to consider the future (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966), though at the slightly earlier age 
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of five to six years children have been found to produce anticipatory thoughts of 
threat (Vasey, 1991).  
For the child who already has experienced an extremely frightening event, it 
may be considerably easier to conceive of future threats, as demonstrated in the study 
of Dollinger et al. (1984). For children exposed to trauma, worry may be directed 
towards the prevention of the reoccurrence of an experienced event. In adult 
populations, it has been proposed that beliefs regarding the importance of worry, 
especially as a way of coping with future anticipated threats, play a key role in the 
maintenance of high levels of anxiety (GAD; Wells, 1995). The role of the meta-
cognitive beliefs outlined by Wells (1995) have not yet received attention with 
regards to childhood anxiety disorders, yet Vasey (1993) has acknowledged that the 
role of children’s beliefs concerning their own problem solving skills and cognitive 
states are related to uncontrollable worry. Future research directed at examining 
children’s beliefs regarding worry could highlight how children think about the future 
following trauma and whether an endorsement of worry may maintain elevated levels 
of anxiety and contribute to the maintenance of PTSD. 
For some time it has been known that following a traumatic event adults 
suffering from PTSD demonstrate an attentional bias (as measured using the modified 
Stroop task) towards trauma-related cues than adults not suffering from PTSD 
(Cassiday, McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992; Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 
1991; Kaspi & McNally, 1991; McNally, Kaspi, Riemann and Zeitlin, 1990; 
Thrasher, Dalgleish & Yule, 1994). A variety of explanations have been proposed for 
why such a bias occurs (see Thrasher & Dalgleish, 1999, for a review), but no clear 
account exists as to why different methodologies for examining attentional biases 
(e.g. the dichotic listening task; Trandel & McNally, 1987) do not demonstrate the 
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same bias as conclusively. Brewin et al. (1996) view the presence of attentional bias 
as indicator that SAMs of a traumatic event have not been processed and are 
accompanied by high levels of emotion. 
Three studies involving samples of children exposed to traumatic events have 
investigated the role of attentional biases in this age group. Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-
Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish (1999), in a study using the modified Stroop task, found 
that children aged nine to 17 years who had been exposed to traumatic events such as 
MVAs or assaults, demonstrated an attentional bias towards trauma-related words, 
relative to neutral words and to children who had not been exposed to trauma. 
Unfortunately a sample of children who had been exposed to trauma but did not 
develop PTSD was not included in this study, and as the authors conclude, the 
children included in the study were old enough to have met all the significant 
cognitive developmental milestones. The same samples of children also performed the 
dot probe task (Dalgleish, Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 2001). Children 
with PTSD selectively allocated attention towards socially threatening stimuli, and 
away from depression-related stimuli (no trauma-related stimuli were used).  
Ribchester (2001) has overcome some of the failings of these studies into 
children’s selective attention following trauma. Ribchester found that children 
suffering from PTSD who had been exposed to a MVA demonstrated greater response 
latencies towards trauma-related words on a modified Stroop task, relative to other 
word categories and a sample of children also exposed to MVAs but not suffering 
from PTSD. In addition to using an appropriate control group, this study also found 
that the threat-specific attentional bias was eliminated following treatment with eye 
movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR).  
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Although the findings from these studies are broadly consistent with others 
that have examined attentional biases in anxious children (Vasey et al., 1995, 1996), it 
has not been demonstrated that such biases play a role in the maintenance of PTSD in 
either children or adults. It remains to be established whether attentional bias is a 
discrete cognitive process involved in the etiology and maintenance of PTSD, an 
experimental index of PTSD symptoms (e.g., hypervigilance), or, as Brewin et al. 
(1996) have suggested, an indicator of the presence of unprocessed SAMs. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
It has not been the aim of this article to outline the effects that trauma has on a 
child’s development and distal psychopathology (see Pynoos et al., 1999, for such an 
account). This is not to say that trauma and PTSD do not have long-term 
developmental consequences for children, in terms of both psychopathology, and 
more general functioning such as school performance. The work of Bolton, O'Ryan, 
Udwin, Boyle, and Yule (2000) in the follow-up of children involved in the Jupiter 
disaster demonstrated that children are at a greater risk in the aftermath of a traumatic 
event of developing a range of anxiety and affective disorders, especially if they have 
PTSD. Rather, it has been the purpose of this article to stress the need for a more 
detailed understanding of the precise mechanisms that govern the incidence and 
course of post-traumatic stress reactions, as well as how other psychopathology can 
result following a traumatic event. 
The present article has not been aimed at conclusively advocating any specific 
cognitive-behavioral model for the understanding of children and adolescents’ 
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reactions to trauma, but has argued that adopting a “dual representation” framework 
in attempting to understand PTSD in children and adolescents may be useful. It has 
been demonstrated that children with post-traumatic stress disorder possess both 
representations of traumatic events that fit within the notion of SAMs, and verbally 
accessible memories and that incorporate maladaptive appraisals and “secondary 
emotions” that are associated with a worse outcome, the key aspects of the 
architecture described by both Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000).  
Adopting such a framework to the understanding of PTSD in children and 
adolescents offers specific directions for future research. First, predictions can be 
made regarding how the time course of PTSD varies according to a child’s 
developmental stage. Very young children, who are largely dependent on their 
caregivers to appraise danger and for the formation of a coherent narrative of a 
distressing event (Salmon & Bryant, 2002), would be likely to form PTSD 
symptomatology in the short-term following a traumatic event (largely as a function 
of their caregiver’s levels of distress and communication with their child); lacking the 
verbal ability and emotional regulatory capacities to process their SAM 
representations of the trauma, PTSD symptoms, if present, may remain at a stable 
level for a long period of time. Elementary school-aged children would be able to lay 
down more coherent memories of a trauma than very young children. Those that do 
lay down the kinds of memories that give rise to re-experiencing and hyperarousal 
may be less likely to engage in strategies of coping that impair the processing of such 
memories, e.g. cognitive avoidance, rumination, or worry, as they lack the more 
abstract cognitive abilities that motivate and enable the use of such coping. Older 
children and adolescents, like elementary school-aged children, would be able to 
appraise an event as traumatic on their own and be more able to form a coherent 
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memory of it represented in a verbal format. However, they are also more able to 
engage in maladaptive ways of coping, and so a significant minority of this age group, 
much in the same way as adults, would be likely to form chronic reactions to trauma. 
Second, the role of the family, already demonstrated to be important in the 
development of PTSD in children and adolescents (Smith, Perrin, Yule, & Rabe-
Hesketh, 2001), may be further investigated. In the context of a dual representation 
account of PTSD, a child’s family may be play a role in moderating PTSD at a 
number of points: by enabling a child to verbalize a traumatic event as it occurs, 
enabling the verbalization and emotional processing of a traumatic event in its 
aftermath, and influencing a child’s appraisals and coping styles after a traumatic 
event. 
Third, the role of pre-traumatic psychological disorders in increasing the risk 
of PTSD (Asarnow et al., 1999; La Greca, Silverman, & Wasserstein, 1998) may be 
better understood. Pre-existing elevated arousal may lead to a child laying down more 
emotion-laden memories and be related to the onset of PTSD, while the presence of 
maladaptive cognitive and meta-cognitive styles may play a role in the maintenance 
of posttraumatic symptomatology. 
Fourth, the increased prevalence of emotional disorders in children and 
adolescents exposed to trauma may be further investigated. As has already been 
demonstrated in adults exposed to trauma (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999), 
a child’s appraisals following a trauma may be associated with depression and 
anxiety, as well as post-traumatic symptomatology.  
Fifth, our understanding of the role of verbal accounts of a trauma may be 
further informed. An examination of the literature on child and adult reactions to 
trauma highlights the need to understand the degree to which the remission of PTSD 
 34
is related to the formation of verbally-based memories of a traumatic event. Both the 
adult cognitive models outlined above and a number of theorists in the domain of 
child and adolescent PTSD (Fivush, 1998; Salmon & Bryant, 2002) have highlighted 
the need for individuals exposed to trauma to form a coherent memory of a traumatic 
event that is represented in a verbal format. In one study of adults treated for PTSD 
using exposure it was found that the transformation of sensory and action-oriented 
descriptions of the traumatic event to meaningful and reflective accounts was 
associated with clinical improvement (Amir, Stafford, Freshman, & Foa, 1998). It is 
unclear whether it is the change in narrative structure that is associated with an 
improvement in post-traumatic stress symptomatology, or other factors that are 
influenced by exposure techniques, such as the extinction of conditioned fear 
responses.  
Sixth, the importance attached to forms of cognitive avoidance by both Ehlers 
and Clark (2000) and Brewin et al. (1996) suggests that future research may be 
usefully directed towards understanding how children’s use of thought control 
strategies varies across development. Research into children’s use of other cognitive 
activities (such as worry and rumination) across development will further inform how 
maladaptive coping maintains PTSD. 
The case for applying elements of adult approaches to psychopathology to the 
understanding of childhood emotional disorder has already been made, e.g., the 
information processing perspective on anxiety (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). However, 
there exists in this application of adult theory the danger that “the more the research is 
about psychopathology, the less it is about development [Steinberg, 2002, p.127]”. 
Adopting a dual representation framework does preclude developmental 
considerations when understanding children’s reactions to traumatic events. Rather, 
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such a framework allows investigation into developmental influences on the specific 
processes that contribute to the onset and maintenance of PTSD. 
While considered the “first-line” approach to treatment, the “active 
ingredients” of cognitive-behavior therapy for PTSD in children and adolescents have 
yet to be established (Cohen, Berliner, & March, 2000). Exposure treatments have 
been shown to be effective in child as well as adult populations (Saigh, Yule, & 
Inamdar, 1996), but the success of this treatment could be attributable to different 
therapeutic processes. As mentioned above, exposure treatment may allow a reduction 
in the negative affect and arousal incorporated in traumatic memories, modify the 
structure and form of the traumatic memory such that the memories are less likely to 
be triggered by external sensory stimuli, or both of these processes.  The role of 
cognitive elements of CBT similarly needs clarification, and it is suggested that 
cognitive interventions will benefit from incorporating an understanding of children’s 
cognitive avoidant and meta-cognitive processes in the aftermath of trauma. The 
framework presented here for understanding elements of children’s and adolescents’ 
reactions to trauma may inform how cognitive behavioral treatments might be 
improved and tailored to a child’s development. 
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